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Machine Generalization and Human Categorization: 
An Information-Theoretic View 
1. INTRODUCTION 
James E. Corter 
Columbia University 
Mark A. Gluck 
Stanford University 
In designing an intelligent system that must be able to explain its reasoning to a 
human user, or to provide generalizations that the human user finds reasonable, it may he 
useful to take into consideration psychological data on what types of concepts and 
categories people naturally use. The psychological literature on concept learning and 
categorization provides strong evidence that certain categories are more easily learned, 
recalled, and recognized than others. We show here how a measure of the informational 
value of a category predicts the results of several important categorization experiments 
better than standard alternative explanations. This suggests that information-based 
approaches to machine generalization may prove particularly useful and natural for 
human users of the systems. 
2. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN OPTIMAL CATEGORY? 
2.1 Psychological Evidence Concerning the Optimality of Categories 
Many studies have shown that some categories or groupings of instances are easier 
than others to learn and recall as coherent concepts or generalizations. For example, 
within a hierarchically nested set of categories (such as a taxonomy of animals), there is 
Borne level of abstraction--called the "basic level"--that is most natural for people to use 
(Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). For example, in the hierarchy 
animal-bird-robin, bird is the basic level category. The preferrential status of basic level 
categories can be measured in a variety of ways. Basic level names are generally learned 
earlier by children (Rosch et al., 1976; Daehler, Lonardo, and Bukatko, 1979), and arise 
earlier in the development of languages (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973). People tend 
to spontaneously name pictured objects at the basic level, and can name them faster at 
this level than at subordinate or superordinate levels (Rosch et al., 1976; Jolicoeur, Gluck, 
& Kosslyn, Hl84). 
For their guidance and comments, we are indebted to Gordon Bower, Paul Rosenbloom, 
Misha Pavel, W. K. Estes, Peter Cheeseman, Ed Smith, Doug Medin, Joachim Hoffmann, and Greg 
Murphy. The assistance or Katie Albiston and Audrey Weinland is also gratefuly acknowledged. 
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e.e Structural Ezplonation• of the Optimalit11 of Categorie1 
Recent findings suggest that the superiority of basic level categories is due to 
llructural properties of the categories, that is, to the distribution of features across 
instances and non-instances (Murphy & Smith, 1982; Hoffmann & Ziessler, 1983). Rosch 
& Mervis (1975) suggested that basic-level categories are those for which the average cue 
validity of the features for the category is maximal. Cue validity is the extent to which 
the presence of a feature I predicts the presence of a category c, and is generally measured 
by �ell), the conditional probability of the category given the feature. Another possibility 
is that basic level categories are those for which category validity is maximal. Category 
validity is the converse of cue validity: it represents the extent to which knowing that 
something is a member of a category enables prediction that it has the feature, and is 
measured by �Jlc). 
There are, however, logical problems with these measures as pointed out by Mur­
phy (1982) and Medin (1983). In a strict hierarchy of concepts, cue validity will always 
select the most general or inclusive level as optimal, while category validity will tend to 
select the most specific categories as best. All the types of evidence we mentioned above, 
such as reaction time to name objects, indicate that it is generally some intermediate level 
of generalization that is optimal. 
A third possibilty, suggested by Jones (1983), is that basic level categories are 
those that maximize some function combining cue and category validity. Jones s1,1ggested 
the product of the two measures as a possible function, and termed this the feature collo­
cation measure. In a later section we will examine the performance of all three of these 
measures in predicting data from certain categorization experiments. 
A serious problem with all of these measures is that they are purely extensional, 
measuring regularities and invariances in the world irrespective of the contexts and needs 
of the people who are creating and using concepts and categories. We present here an 
alternative contezt-un8itive measure of the utility of categorizations. 
9. CATEGORY UTILITY 
9.1 The Informational Value of Categoriea 
We suggest that the degree to which certain concepts are favored over others may 
be related to how useful these concepts are for encoding and communicating information 
about the properties of things in the world. In other words, the most useful categories are 
those that are, on the average, optimal for communicating information (hence reducing 
uncertainty) about the properties of instances. We will show how to formalize this idea in 
situations where the relevant attributes are well defined. 
We consider two specific definitions of uncertainty and show the implications of 
each for Category Utility. First, we utilize the standard definition of uncertainty from 
information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), and show what it implies about Category 
Utility. Second, we consider a hypothetical communication game in which one person 
attempts to tramJmit information about an item's attributes to another person. Within 
this game, we interpret uncertainty as an inability to predict attributes, and analyze how 
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category membership information can be used to transmit information about the attri­
butes of objects or events. 
We will describe our theory of Category Utility within the context of a finite popu­
lation of items, each of which is describable in terms of a set of multi-valued nominal 
attribute dimensions. Each attribute dimension (e.g. eye color) is assumed to have a set 
of possible values (e.g. green, brown, blue), one of which occurs in every instance. A 
category of instances can be described by specifying the di6tribution6 of attribute values 
for instances in the category. For example, a specific category of faces may have 40% 
green eyes, 50% brown eyes, and 10% blue eyes. 
In information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), the uncertainty of a set, F, of u 
messages (i.e. F = f1,/2, • • • ,f,) is given by 
" 
U(F) =- � P(f;)logP(f;). 
i=l 
We consider an attribute dimension to be a set of messages regarding the possible values 
of the attribute dimension. Consider also a partition, C, of a population of objects into 
two sets: those which are members of a category c and those which are not. Given infor­
mation that an item is a member of category c, the uncertainty of the values of attribute 
dimension F will be: 
" 
U(f1c) =- � P(f;lc)logP(/;Ic), 
i=l 
where P(f;lc) is the conditional probability that a member of category c has valu� /;on 
attribute dimension F. If instances of c occcur with probability I( c) and instances of 
not-e occur with probability (1-1( c)), then the expected reduction in uncertainty when 
one is told the category or not-category information is: 
Category Utility(C,F) 
This measure of Category Utility is identical to the standard notion of the information 
trammitted between the message sets C and F. 
In certain applications, we may be interested in defining the informational value of 
category c separately from that of not-c. The Category Utility of category c alone is 
given by: 
9./l The Gueuing-Game Mea6ure of Category Utility 
The information-theoretic measures of Category Utility given in the preceding sec­
tion have close connections to expected performance in a feature prediction task. If we 
consider the expected score of someone guessing the values of each attribute dimension of 
an item, we can compare their expected score when they know nothing about the item to 
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their expected score when they are told whether the items belong to c or not-c. 
Assuming that the receiver adopts a probability-matching 1trategy (e.g. the receiver 
guesses value /i with a probability equal to his expectation of the likelihood of /i occuring 
given c or not-c) their expected increase in score given the category message can be shown 
to be given by: 
[ ft ft � ft 
Category Utility(C,F) = �c)��/ilc)2 + (1-�c))_E�/il not c)2 -��/if· 1=1 1=1 1=1 
If the receiver is assumed to have no information about the not-e distribution, then the 
expected increase in score is 
Category Utility(e,F) = �c)
[E �/ilc)2- t �/i)2] . 
1=1 1=1 
The information-theoretic and expected-score measures of Category Utility are 
closely related both in mathematical form and in terms of how they order categories as to 
relative goodness because lofi.p) approximates to p for small numbers. Futhermore, 
assumptions about alternate guessing strategies have little effect on the predicted order­
ings of categorization utility as long as the strategy predicts that the receiver will do best 
when one attribute value is certain and will do worst when all attribute values are equally 
likely. In all our empirical applications to date, the most significant discrepancy between 
results of the information-theoretic and the feature-prediction versions are a few cases in 
which a tie in the goodness of two categories was broken by use of the other version. 
.J. APPLICATIONS TO CATEGORIZATION EXPERIMENTS 
4.1 Murphy and Smith (198£} 
Subjects in these experiments were taught nonsense names for a hierarchy of 
artificial categories with three levels of abstraction: �ubordinate, intermediate, and 
superordinate. In a later testing phase, subjects were shown a picture of a stimulus item, 
along with a category name, and were asked to indicate whether or not the stimulus was a 
member of the named category. The stimuli consisted of sixteen line drawings identified to 
subjects as examples of fictitious tools. The stimuli varied in their size (large or small) 
and in the shapes of their handles, shafts, and heads. This suggests a natural representa­
tion of the stimuli using four nominal attributes. 
We evaluated the ability of Category Utility to predict which one of these levels of 
categorization is optimal. The optimal level is operationally defined to be the level at 
which people are quickest to verify that an object �s a member of the category. According 
to our theory, the average Category Utility of the categories at a given level should be 
highest for this optimal level. We calculated both the average Category Utility( c,F) of the 
individual categories and the average Category Utility(C,F) of the partitions induced by 
each individual category. For comparison, we also calculated the average cue validity, 
category validity, and the product of these two (G. Jones' (1983) "collocation" measure). 
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The intermediate level, the level that Murphy and Smith expected to be the basic 
level, indeed showed the fastest average name verification time, followed by the superordi­
nate level. The subordinate level showed the longest reaction times. Cue validity, 
category validity, and Jones' collocation measure all failed to pick out this level as optimal 
- cue validity and the collocation measure selected the superordinate level, w bile category 
validity was constant across all levels. The average Category Utility(C,F) identified the 
basic and superordinate categories as equally good, with the subordinate level as worst. 
The average Category Utility( c ,F) correctly identified the order of relative goodness as 
basic, superordinate, subordinate. 
4.2 Hoffmann und Zie66ler {1983) 
Hoffmann and Ziessler (1983) replicated the basic level phenomena using three 
artificial category hierarchies. The hierarchies were differentiated by the degree to which 
exemplars of categories at different levels share common attribute values. Thus, a 
different level was expected to be basic in each of the hierarchies. 
Subjects were assigned to learn one of the three hierarchies. They were taught to 
associate each item with category names at three levels of generality (e.g. exemplar, inter­
mediate, superordinate ) . Following this, subjects were presented with a picture of one of 
the items, paired with a concept name. They were asked to verify, as quickly as possible, 
whether or not the picture was an example of the named category. In a second task, they 
were asked to recall the correct name at a given level of abstraction. Reaction times for 
both the verification and naming studies indicated that the basic level was at the superor­
dinate level for one hierachy, at the intermediate level another, and at the exemplar level 
for the third hierarchy. 
In these studies, cue validity and the collocation measure invariably identified the 
highest level as best. Category validity failed to distinguish between any of the levels. In 
summary, these measures were insensitive to the manipulation of attributes across the 
three hierarchies; each failed to predict the basic level in at least two out of three studies. 
The average Category Utility(c,F) correctly predicted the ordering of reaction times for 
the three levels in each of the three hierarchies, with the exception of giving equal ratings 
to the basic and intermediate levels in the first hierarchy. The average Category 
Utility( C ,F) correctly predicted the ordering of reaction times in all three hierarchies. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The results from these experiments indicate that Category Utility is able to predict 
the psychologically preferred level of categorization in these verification and naming exper­
iments. None of the alternative measures did nearly as well . An additional advantage to 
the measure is that it is context sensitive: Category Utility is computed as an expected 
decreau in uncertainty given some context population. Thus, this affords a way of 
measuring how the utility of a category or generalization can change depending on the 
context in which it is analyzed. This is particularly important from a psychological stand­
point because of evidence indicating that the usefulness of categories and concepts is 
highly context dependent (Barsalou; 1982). 
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We have argued that the evidence indicates that psychologically preferred 
categories tend to be those that maximize potential information transfer. A number of 
clustering schemes have been advanced for finding duster solutions that maximize infor­
mation (e.g. Lance & Williams, 1966; Wallace & Boulton, 1968). More recent work that 
attempts to form prototype-based representations of categories while maximizing informa­
tional value has been done by Hanson (1985). We suggest that the results of such cluster­
ing programs may be particularly consistent with the types of categorizations made by 
humans, hence more explainable and valuable to users. 
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